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NOT SUCH A FIXED STAR AFTER ALL: WEST VIRGINIA
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION V. BARNETTE, AND THE
CHANGING MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
NOT TO SPEAK
Genevieve Lakier*
There are few 75-year-old opinions that are as important to
contemporary free speech law as Justice Jackson’s gorgeous opinion in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.1 Barnette’s continuing
relevance to First Amendment jurisprudence was recently demonstrated quite
vividly by the fact that it was cited—in fact quoted— in all three of the major
free speech cases the Supreme Court handed down last term.2 It isn’t only at
the Supreme Court, however, that the septuagenarian opinion continues to
exert influence over free speech disputes. Across the country, state and
federal courts routinely invoke Barnette as support for the proposition that
the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment guarantees a right
not to speak, as well as a right to speak, and on that basis use it to justify the
invalidation of all manner of disclosure, notice, and compelled subsidization
laws.3
At first glance, the enduring vitality of Justice Jackson’s opinion in
Barnette suggests something reassuring about the modern First Amendment
tradition: namely, that it is consistent over time, that the principles courts rely
upon in resolving free speech cases are stable and enduring and not easily
changed by the vicissitudes of political circumstance and judicial temper.
Upon closer inspection, however, this reassuring reading turns out to be hard
*
Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Geoffrey Stone, Lior
Strahilevitz, and David Strauss for their extremely helpful comments, and to FIU Law Review for
organizing an excellent and stimulating symposium.
1

319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018);
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2387 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).
2

3 See, e.g., Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 85–86 (2d Cir. 2018) (striking down prison policy
that required inmates in state prison to snitch on fellow inmates as a violation of the prohibition against
compelled speech first articulated in Barnette); Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v.
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 879 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 2018) (striking down city ordinance that
required pro-life pregnancy centers to post a disclaimer in their waiting room notifying clients that they
do not provide abortion or birth-control services); Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d 1199, 1204, 1208 (9th Cir.
2014) (striking down a school policy that required students to wear shirts bearing the school logo); Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. N.L.R.B., 717 F.3d 947, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (invalidating National Labor Relations
Board regulation requiring employers to post notices of employee rights in the workplace).
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to sustain. This is because if one looks at how contemporary courts invoke
Barnette, what becomes apparent is that the decision is today taken to mean
something that it is highly unlikely the members of the Court who joined
Justice Jackson’s majority opinion intended, and something that is very
difficult to justify under the reasoning in the opinion itself.
Rather than demonstrating the stability of foundational First
Amendment precepts, what Barnette’s long life thus demonstrates is largely
the opposite: namely, the subtle but profound shift that has taken place over
time in the judicial conception of the First Amendment, the interests it
protects, and the constraints it imposes on government power. This shift can
be described in various ways: as a move away from a democracy-focused
First Amendment towards an autonomy-focused one, as a turn away from a
positive and towards a negative-rights model of the First Amendment, and as
the Lochnerization of the First Amendment. However we describe it, the
result has been a significant expansion in the scope of the First Amendment
right not to speak and a reconceptualization of Barnette itself. To see this, it
is necessary first to untangle what Barnette actually held from how it is
remembered today.
*
In Barnette, the Court faced (as virtually every student of free speech
law learns) a First Amendment challenge to a West Virginia regulation that
required students in the state’s public schools to salute the US flag or risk
expulsion.4 A group of Jehovah’s Witnesses who had children in the public
schools sought an injunction restraining the government from enforcing the
regulation against their children. They argued that because their religious
faith prohibited them from saluting the flag, enforcement of the regulation
against their children would violate both their and their children’s free
exercise and free speech rights.5 The district court that initially heard the case
granted their request for an injunction to prevent school officials from
enforcing the regulation, and, on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.6
Unlike the district court, however, the Supreme Court resolved the case on
free speech rather than free exercise grounds.
The Court concluded that the regulation violated the free speech rights
of the Jehovah Witness children, and by proxy their parents, because it forced
them to espouse a belief in the importance of the flag that they did not possess
and thereby deprived them of a freedom that Justice Jackson insisted was by
4 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625–26. For more background on the case see Vincent Blasi and Seana V.
Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and
Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 433 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
5

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629–30.

6

Id. at 630, 642.
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1943 “commonplace” knowledge that the First Amendment protected.7 This
was the freedom to express whatever “belief and . . . attitude of mind” one
desired, except when doing so posed a “clear and present danger of a kind
the State is empowered to prevent and punish.”8 Because the government did
not claim that participation in the ceremony was necessary to avert a clear
and present danger, the Court concluded that participation in the flag salute
ceremonies could not be required of Jehovah’s Witnesses or, for that matter,
anyone else.9
In holding as much, the Court overruled its earlier decision in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,10 upholding a very similar mandatory
flag salute law against a First Amendment challenge, and reaffirmed its
commitment to the minority-protecting, diversity-promoting conception of
the free speech guarantee it had begun to sketch out in earlier decisions, such
as Cantwell v. Connecticut.11 The decision was, in this respect, very
significant. It was also, however, clearly limited.
In his majority opinion, Justice Jackson was careful to specify the facts
that made the free speech question at issue in the case relatively
straightforward.12 He noted, for example, that this was not a case in which
the Court had to resolve conflicting rights claims.13 If there had been a
conflict of this sort, Justice Jackson suggested that the outcome might have
been different because the state’s justification for acting would have been
greatly enhanced.14 The outcome might also have been different, Justice
Jackson suggested, if the education the state threatened to deny to students
who refused to salute the flag was something those students freely chose to
avail themselves of rather than a compulsory obligation.15 Finally, and most
importantly for our purposes, Justice Jackson noted that this was not a case
in which the state merely “require[d] teaching by instruction and study of . . .
our history and . . . the structure and organization of our government” or
7

Id. at 633.

8

Id.

9

Id. at 633–34.

10

See generally 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (construing the First Amendment as a “shield [under which] many
types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.”).
11

12 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 (“The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision
are obscure but because the flag involved is our own.”).
13 Id. at 630 (noting that “the refusal of [the school children] to participate in the [flag salute]
ceremony d[id] not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so.”).
14 Id. (asserting that it is cases in which there is a “collision” between competing rights that “most
frequently require intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one end and those of another
begin.”).
15

Id. at 632.
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“acquaint[ed students] with the flag salute, so that they may be informed as
to what it is or . . . what it means.” 16 This, Justice Jackson made clear, it
absolutely could do.17 What it could not do was compel students to attest to
beliefs they did not hold without infringing the “right of self-determination
in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude” that the First
Amendment guaranteed.18
The opinion in Barnette thus established an important but limited
principle: namely, that the government may not compel individuals to
espouse beliefs that they do not hold when those beliefs touch on “matters of
individual opinion and personal attitude,” except when doing so is necessary
to avert a clear and present danger or perhaps to determine access to an
optional government benefit. Notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s forceful
assertion in perhaps the most famous passage of the opinion that it is a “fixed
star in our constitutional constellation” that “no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion,” the opinion did not in fact prohibit the government from
using its power of the purse or the bully pulpit to promote certain “orthodox”
ideas—such as, for example, the idea that the United States is a nation under
God, the flag its quasi-sacred symbol.19 It merely prohibited the government
from affirmatively requiring private citizens to endorse those ideas. The
opinion also did not suggest, even in a whisper, that the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment was threatened when the government
compelled individuals to speak about matters that were not a question of
individual opinion and personal attitude. To the contrary, it strongly implied
that, in the school context, at least, the government could compel students to
speak about matters of fact as part of the ordinary course of civic education.20

16 Id. at 631 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J.,
dissenting)).
17

Id.

18

Id. at 631, 634.

Id. at 642. Justice Jackson made clear, for example, that the government of West Virginia could
continue to organize “voluntary and spontaneous” flag salute ceremonies, and other “patriotic ceremonies”
of that sort without facing any constitutional difficulties. Id. at 641. See Steven D. Smith, Law and Cultural
Conflict: Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 626 (2003) (“[T]he Court [did not suggest]
that a state is somehow forbidden to conduct Pledge exercises in public schools and to encourage student
participation. If the Pledge expressed a sort of terse orthodoxy . . . and if articulating, endorsing, and
officially sponsoring the Pledge amounted to ‘prescribing’ it, then the Barnette Court was not in fact
forbidding prescription in the case itself; it ruled only that the state could not force unwilling students to
participate.”).
19

20 Id. at 631. In a footnote, Justice Jackson chastised school officials in the United States for failing
to attend to the educational dimensions of the flag salute. He cited, in particular, a recent study that found
that few children were able “to remember and state the meaning of the flag salute which they recited each
day.” Id. at 631 n.12 (citing Herbert T. Olander, Children’s Knowledge of the Flag Salute, 35 J. EDUC.
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For the first three decades after it was handed down, this was certainly
how the decision was interpreted. When the Court cited Barnette, it
invariably did so as support for the proposition that the government could not
require its citizens to “contribute to the support of an[y] ideological cause
[they] may oppose” or to attest to beliefs they did not hold.21 It did not read
Barnette to forbid the government from advocating particular ideas or beliefs,
nor did it construe Barnette to apply when the government compelled speech
to attest to beliefs they did hold or to disclose facts that were not a matter of
opinion. The Court made clear, for example, that laws that required school
teachers and public servants to swear that they would perform their public
duties lawfully and in accordance with the U.S. Constitution posed no
constitutional problem, so long as their purpose was not to penalize those
who held disfavored political opinions.22 In general, the Court struck down
laws that compelled speakers to disclose true facts only when their practical
effect was to make it difficult for those they regulated to put forward their
own point of view.23
The Court’s understanding of Barnette and the principle that it
established began to shift, however, in the wake of its 1974 decision in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.24 In Tornillo, the Court struck down a
Florida law that required local newspapers to offer political candidates,
whose “personal . . . or official” character they criticized, a right of reply.25
The Court held that the law was unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it
imposed a penalty on newspapers that chose to engage in certain kinds of
RES. 300, 305 (1941)). The implication here is that, rather than mandating participation in the flag salute,
school officials should make sure that students could remember and state its meaning.
21 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977). See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S.
820, 858 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The holding of Barnette was that, no matter how strong or weak
such beliefs might be, the Legislature of West Virginia was not free to require as concrete and intimate an
expression of belief in any cause as that involved in a compulsory pledge of allegiance.”).
22

See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972) (discussing the cases).

The decision in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), illustrates this approach. In that case,
the Court held that a court order that required the Alabama branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to disclose true facts—namely, the names and addresses of its
members—violated the First Amendment. The Court held that the order violated the First Amendment
because, given the circumstances in which the order applied (namely, Jim Crow Alabama), its enforcement
would make it very difficult for members of the NAACP to exercise their freedom of association. Id. at
462–63. Nowhere in the opinion did the Court suggest that had the circumstances been different, the
Alabama court could not have required the NAACP to disclose the names of its members. It merely noted
that insisted that “[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs.” Id. at 462. The Court assumed, in other words, that the constitutional harm wrought by the
Alabama law was not that it required the NAACP to speak but that doing so would make it difficult for
the organization to continue to promote its political agenda.
23

24

418 U.S. 241 (1974).

25

Id. at 244.
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political critique by requiring them to give up scarce and valuable column
inches of space to the candidates’ reply when they did so.26 Second, it limited
the editorial freedom of newspaper editors by requiring them to print material
in their newspapers they would otherwise not. In his majority opinion, Chief
Justice Burger made clear that the fact that the law intruded upon the editorial
freedom of newspaper editors meant that it would violate the First
Amendment even if it did not make it more difficult or more expensive for
newspapers to engage in political critique.27 This was because, he explained,
“[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as
to limitations on the size and content of the paper . . . constitute the exercise
of editorial control and judgment [and i]t has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time.”28
The Court’s first explanation for why the Florida law was
unconstitutional was entirely in keeping with Barnette, and its interpretation
of the First Amendment as a safeguard of “self-determination in matters that
touch individual opinion and personal attitude.” But its second explanation
was plainly not. After all, Barnette did not hold that the government violated
the First Amendment whenever it limited the “editorial freedom” of school
children by telling them what they could or could not say. In Tornillo, the
Court thus read into the First Amendment a far more expansive right against
compelled speech than Barnette had suggested. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger
did not cite Barnette once in his majority opinion.
There is no reason why the Court had to rely on the same principle to
decide Tornillo as it relied upon in Barnette. The two cases were easily
distinguishable. Most obviously, in Tornillo, the Court addressed the
question of what rights newspapers enjoy under the Press Clause of the First
Amendment, whereas in Barnette, the Court addressed the question of what
rights school children possess under the Speech Clause. One can easily
understand why the Court might have wished to grant newspapers and other
members of the press greater independence from state control than other
kinds of speakers, given the important structural role the press plays in the
democratic system of government that the First Amendment helps to

26

Id. at 256–57.

Id. at 258 (“Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory
access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply,
the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the
function of editors.”).
27

28

Id.
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safeguard.29 In Tornillo’s wake, however, the Court did not distinguish the
two cases along these or any other lines. Instead, it read the two cases
together.
The result was a significant change in the Court’s understanding of
Barnette. Consider in this respect the 1977 decision in Wooley v. Maynard,
which struck down a state law that required residents to display the state
motto “Live Free or Die” on their license plates.30 The law at issue in Wooley,
like the law at issue in Barnette, compelled speakers to endorse—albeit, in
this case, only tacitly—a contestable belief. As such, the Court could easily
have resolved the question of its constitutionality by relying on Barnette
alone. In striking down the law, however, the Court invoked not only
Barnette but also Tornillo, which it construed as a case that “illustrated” the
principle first articulated in Barnette: namely, that “the right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’” 31 Barnette of course did not hold
that the right to speak and the right not to speak were complementary
components of something called freedom of mind.32 It merely held that, just
as the government could not prohibit speakers from taking positions on
contested matters of opinion, it could not compel them to do so either.
Tornillo, meanwhile, said nothing about what freedom of mind the Speech
Clause guaranteed; as I noted earlier, it was resolved exclusively on Press
Clause grounds. By reading the two decisions together, the Court thus
changed the meaning of both. It suggested that Barnette found in the Speech
Clause a similarly expansive right not to speak as Tornillo found in the Press
Clause.

29 For an argument along these lines, see Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the
Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 653 (1975).
30

430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).

31

Id. at 714 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).

Indeed, the phrase “freedom of mind” appeared only one time in Jackson’s opinion, in a passage
in which Justice Jackson argued that enforcing the Bill of Rights did not mean “to choose weak
government over strong government” but instead meant “to adhere as a means of strength to individual
freedom of mind in preference to [the] officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a
disappointing and disastrous end.” Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. This assertion is, of course, entirely in
keeping with the nuanced rule the majority sketched out. It is true that in his concurring opinion (which
he wrote in addition to joining Justice Jackson’s majority opinion), Justice Murphy did suggest that the
right to speak and not to speak might be complementary rights. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The
right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution . . . includes both the right
to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential operations of
government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society—as in the case of compulsion to give
evidence in court.”). Not one other member of the Court joined Justice Murphy’s concurrence, however.
32
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The Court made this explicit in its 1988 decision in Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind.33 The case involved a state law that required
professional fundraisers, who solicited funds on behalf of charities, to
disclose to potential donors how much of the money they received in
donations they actually turned over to the charities they worked for.34 The
North Carolina legislature had enacted the law after it came to light that
fundraisers were keeping in some cases over 80% of the money they collected
for charity, without disclosing as much to potential donors.35 North Carolina
defended the law by arguing that “the First Amendment interest in compelled
speech [was] different [and lesser] than the interest in compelled silence”—
at least in cases such as this one, where the government compelled speakers
to disclose only true facts.36 The Court disagreed. It insisted that the decisions
in Barnette, Tornillo, and Wooley established the “constitutional
equivalence” between [laws that] “compelled speech and [laws that]
compelled silence” and that this constitutional equivalence held even when
the government compelled purely factual speech.37 “These cases cannot be
distinguished,” Justice Brennan wrote in his majority opinion, “simply
because they involved compelled statements of opinion while here we deal
with compelled statements of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens
protected speech.”38 The Court concluded as a result that any time the
government compelled speech, no matter its content, its actions should be
subject to “exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”39 Because the North
Carolina law could not satisfy this strict scrutiny, the Court struck it down.40
The Court reaffirmed this expansive view of the prohibition against
compelled speech when it held in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Group of Boston that the government could not require a private
association to include marchers in its parade who expressed a message with
which it disagreed because, under Barnette, the state may “not compel
affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees” and noted also that
“this general rule . . . applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather

33

487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988).

34

Id. at 784.

35

See id.

Id. at 796; see also Brief for Appellants at 12, Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328), 1987 WL 881143, at *1 (“The requirement of truthful, factual
disclosure cannot be said to abridge anyone’s freedom of speech.”).
36

37

Id. at 797.

38

Id. at 797–98.

39

Riley, 487 U.S. at 798.

40

Id. at 798–800.
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avoid.” 41 This principle applied, the Court made clear, even when the
government compelled speech in order to protect the constitutionallyprotected rights of other parties—in this case, those speakers excluded from
the parade.42 It implicitly rejected, in other words, the suggestion in Justice
Jackson’s opinion in Barnette that the government might enjoy greater power
to compel speech in cases where there was a “collision” between competing
constitutionally-protected interests.43
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Court carved out a
limited exception from the strong presumption against compelled speech it
announced in Wooley and Riley when it held that laws that require
commercial advertisers to provide “purely factual and uncontroversial
information” about the products and services they advertise need only satisfy
rational basis scrutiny, not the strict scrutiny these other cases called for.44
The Court justified this holding by pointing to the unique characteristics of
commercial speech. The fact that, unlike other kinds of protected speech,
commercial speech receives constitutional protection primarily to safeguard
the right of its audience to receive the information it communicates rather
than to protect the expressive freedom of its speaker meant, the Court argued,
that commercial advertisers’ “constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information . . . is minimal” at best—and
certainly “not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and
Barnette.”45 It concluded that requiring the government to show that
“disclosure requirements [were] reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers” was therefore sufficient to protect
commercial speakers’ First Amendment rights.46 In holding as much, the
Court obviously rejected the view that there is never a constitutionally
relevant difference between laws that require speakers to take a position on
matters of opinion and laws that required speakers to disclose true or at least
“uncontroversial” facts. Nevertheless, by justifying the distinction on the
basis of the rather unique constitutional status of commercial speech, the
Court implicitly reaffirmed the principle it had articulated in Riley: namely,

41

515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995).

Id. at 570. The Court acknowledged that the group excluded from the parade sought to exercise
its constitutionally protected freedom of speech—and more specifically, wished to “celebrate its members’
identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants, [and] show that there
are such individuals in the community” but did not factor this into its analysis. Id.
42

43

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943).

44

471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).

45

Id.

46

Id.
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that ordinarily, the government may not compel the expression of either fact
or opinion without satisfying strict scrutiny.
Today, the idea that the government acts in a presumptively
unconstitutional manner—outside the commercial speech context at least—
both when it compels speakers to take a position on matters of opinion and
when it compels speakers to assert true facts is a widely accepted, if not
universally embraced, principle of free speech jurisprudence. This principle
was in fact reasserted by the Court just last term in National Institutes of
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra.47 In that case, the Court addressed a free
speech challenge to a California law, the FACT Act, that required clinics that
provided medical care to pregnant women, but typically not abortion, to
notify prospective clients that the state offered free or low-cost medical care,
including abortion, and to provide them a phone number they could call to
learn how to access these services.48 The Court held that because the Act
required clinics to disclose information they did not want to disclose it
constituted a content-based regulation of speech that should ordinarily be
subject to strict scrutiny.49 Justice Breyer, in dissent, strongly disagreed.
Because the California law did not attempt “to ‘prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,’” Justice Breyer argued,
“it d[id] not warrant heightened scrutiny.”50 He vigorously rejected the idea
that it was only when the government regulates commercial speech that the
distinction between laws that compel speech on matters of opinion and laws
that require the disclosure of uncontested facts is a constitutionally relevant
one.51
That Justice Breyer’s dissent in Becerra managed to attract the votes of
only three other members of the Court suggests how much has changed in
free speech jurisprudence since Barnette was handed down. It is not simply
the case that Justice Breyer’s view of when the First Amendment protects a
speaker’s right not to speak tracks much more closely with the language of
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Barnette. It is also the only view of the First
47

138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018).

48

Id. at 2369.

Id. at 2371 (“The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of speech. By compelling
individuals to speak a particular message, such notices ‘alte[r] the content of [their] speech.’”
(quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988))); Id. at 2371 (“Contentbased regulations . . . ‘are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’” (quoting Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015))).
49

50
Id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
51

Id. at 2387–88.
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Amendment right not to speak that makes sense, given the logic of Justice
Jackson’s opinion. To see why, it is necessary to look in more detail at the
argument that Jackson made in Barnette to explain why the West Virginia
law violated the First Amendment.
*
In recent decades, the Court has tended to justify the First Amendment
presumption against laws that compel speech on autonomy grounds. It has
argued that the First Amendment guarantees speakers the right not to speak,
as well as the right to speak, in order to ensure their more general right to
“choose the content of [their] own message.”52 The idea here is that, as Justice
Kennedy put it in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, “[a]t the heart
of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for
himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence.”53
The fact that the Court has tended to view the First Amendment right
not to speak as a mechanism for safeguarding speaker autonomy helps
explain its insistence, in Hurley and other cases, that a presumption of
unconstitutionality applies both when the government compels the
expression “of value, opinion, or endorsement” and when it compels
“statements of fact.”54 After all, in both cases, the government forces the
speaker to say something she might otherwise not and thereby deprives her
of control over the content of her message. Nor is there any reason to assume
that the threat to speaker autonomy posed by laws that compel the expression
of opinion will be categorically greater than the threat posed by laws that
compel the expression of fact. As both Riley and Becerra make clear,
speakers can object to being compelled to communicate facts when those
facts threaten their economic or ideological projects just as strongly as they
can object to being compelled to communicate opinions they do not hold. If
what the First Amendment mostly cares about is preserving the right of
individual speakers to dictate what they will and will not say, it is perfectly
sensible to subject both kinds of laws to the same degree of constitutional
scrutiny.
The Court’s tendency to rely upon an autonomy justification for the
right not to speak also explains, to some degree, the limited carve-out for
laws that compel commercial speakers to disclose information about the
products they advertise. After all, as Justice White’s opinion in Zauderer
52 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (“[T]he
fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose
the content of his own message.”).
53

512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).

54

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
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made clear, commercial speakers have never been held to possess the kinds
of autonomy interests under the First Amendment as other speakers possess.55
The Court has never provided a very satisfying explanation for why this is
the case.56 Nevertheless, if one takes as a given that the First Amendment
protects speaker autonomy except when that speaker engages in commercial
speech, one can well understand why the Court might consider laws that
require commercial speakers to speak to be much less threatening to
constitutional interests than other kinds of compelled speech laws. The fact
that commercial speakers lack a constitutionally-protected autonomy interest
cannot explain why Zauderer only applies to laws that require the disclosure
of true and uncontroversial facts, but it certainly helps make sense of the
distinction the Court has drawn between compelled commercial speech and
other kinds of compelled expression.
The expansive notion of speaker autonomy the Court has relied upon in
recent cases cannot make sense, however, of the nuanced rule that Justice
Jackson’s opinion in Barnette articulated. If the First Amendment protects
the speaker’s autonomy to “choose the content of his own message” it should
prohibit both government actions that compel students to salute the flag and
that compel them to display their knowledge of the history and meaning of
the flag. And yet Barnette strongly suggests that the first compulsion is not
constitutionally problematic, whereas the second compulsion is.
The difficulty one faces trying to explain this aspect of the opinion on
autonomy grounds reflects the fact that the Court’s decision in Barnette was
not motivated ultimately by a belief in the near-absolute right of the speaker
to choose the content of her speech. This is not to say that Justice Jackson’s
opinion evinced no concern for the autonomy of the West Virginia school
children. To the contrary, it is full of stirring affirmations of the importance
of protecting the freedom of dissenters, like the Jehovah Witnesses, to believe
what they will and to publicly express their point of view. But the freedom it
55 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641
(1985); see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14
(2000) (“The Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech should be constitutionally protected so
as to safeguard the circulation of information. It has therefore focused its analysis on the need to receive
information, rather than on the rights of speakers.”).
56 The most convincing justification for the view that commercial speakers do not have
constitutionally protected autonomy interest is the claim that, because the motive of commercial speakers
is purely commercial and not self-expressive, the autonomy they exercise when they speak is not the kind
of autonomy the First Amendment cares about. Edwin Baker made this argument in an influential early
article, and others have more recently articulated similar views. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A
Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 12–15 (1976). This view is problematic, however,
not only because it presumes that commercial speakers do not in fact advance any self-expressive aims
when they speak, which seems unlikely to be true, but because it fails to explain why other kinds of
primarily commercially-oriented actors (movie makers, newspapers, video game manufacturers) do
exercise constitutionally-protected autonomy. For a critique of the special treatment of commercial speech
along these lines see Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 619–22 (1982).
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celebrates—and that it construes the First Amendment to protect—is not the
freedom of the speaker to dictate in almost all circumstances what she will or
will not say. It is instead the freedom produced by, and necessary to, a
democratic system of government. Jackson spelled this out in a crucial
passage towards the end of the opinion. After noting the significant evils
produced by governmental efforts to “coerce uniformity of sentiment”—
including the profound political violence these efforts could engender—
Justice Jackson wrote:
It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment
to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by
avoiding these beginnings. There is no mysticism in the
American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of
its authority. We set up government by consent of the
governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any
legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to
be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by
authority. 57
As this passage makes plain, the Court struck down the West Virginia
flag salute law not because it took from schoolchildren the absolute right to
decide what they would or would not say but, because it violated a
fundamental principle of democratic government: namely, that in a
democratic society, it is the people and not the government that get to decide
contested normative questions—including the contested normative questions
that determine the exercise of governmental power. This is what it means to
say that the government may not coerce the consent of the governed; that its
authority must be controlled by public opinion, not the other way around.58
The flag salute ceremony violated this principle by insisting that there was
only one correct way to think about the nation and the flag that represented
it, and by punishing those who took an alternative view.59

57

W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).

See Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
883 (1963) (“The crucial point . . . is not that freedom of expression is politically useful but that it is
indispensable to the operation of a democratic form of government. Once one accepts the premise of the
Declaration of Independence—that governments derive ‘their just powers from the consent of the
governed’—it follows that the governed must, in order to exercise their right of consent, have full freedom
of expression both in forming individual judgments and in forming the common judgment.”).
58

59 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634. In a footnote, Justice Jackson spelled out some of the contested
political questions buried in the flag salute and accompanying pledge of allegiance. He noted, for example,
that “[u]se of [the word] ‘Republic,’ if rendered to distinguish our government from a ‘democracy,’ or the
words ‘one Nation,’ if intended to distinguish it from a federation, open up old and bitter controversies in
our political history; ‘liberty and justice for all,’ if it must be accepted as descriptive of the present order
rather than an ideal, might to some seem an overstatement. Id. at 634 n.14.
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The fact that the Court invalidated the West Virginia flag salute law
because of its democratic problems, not because of its threat to the autonomy
of the Jehovah Witness schoolchildren, explains many things about the
decision. First, it explains why the Court chose to decide the case on free
speech rather than free exercise grounds. Even if the flag salute law had not
trampled on the religious sensibilities of the Jehovah Witness schoolchildren,
its actions would still have violated fundamental democratic principles, as
the majority understood them. Nothing turned, as a result, on the religious
nature of the objection to the law, as Justice Jackson made clear. 60 This made
the Free Exercise Clause an overly narrow basis for decision, and the Free
Speech Clause a much more natural fit.
The democratic logic of the opinion also explains its almost total lack
of concern with the possibility that the state of West Virginia might require
school children to learn and attest to facts (facts about the flag or the nation,
for example) that they found disagreeable. Educational exercises of this sort
may have the effect of promoting certain value systems and disadvantaging
others, as Justice Jackson acknowledged, quite explicitly.61 But they do not
mandate them; nor do they impose a significant burden on those who possess
heterodox views, at least not if they are conducted—as Justice Jackson
insisted they should be conducted—in a manner that is not “partisan or [the]
enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction.”62
60 Id. at 634 (“Whether the First Amendment to the Constitution will permit officials to order
observance of ritual of this nature does not depend upon whether as a voluntary exercise we would think
it to be good, bad or merely innocuous. . . . Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one’s possession of
particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are held.”).
61 Id. at 631 (noting that by making students “acquainted with the flag salute” the government
could “arouse[ their] loyalties” and that acquaintance with “the guaranties of civil liberty . . . tend to
inspire patriotism and love of country”). As this quote makes clear, Jackson actively endorsed, not merely
tolerated, the state’s use of its educational powers to advance these political goals.
62 Id. at 637. Justice Jackson did not spell out what he thought an education was not partisan or
the enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction would look like, but presumably what he meant by this
was that education should neither advance a partisan ideological agenda nor have the effect of stigmatizing
or marginalizing any group. One might query whether it is ever possible to achieve a truly non-partisan
education, in this sense of the term. Debates about the teaching of evolution and/or creationism in the
classroom demonstrate how difficult it can be for school authorities to provide an education that is not
perceived by some parents and children as stigmatizing or marginalizing their religious faith or point of
view. As a practical, matter, however, it certainly seems possible to draw a distinction between educational
programs that are intended to, or have the effect, of significantly stigmatizing, or privileging, a certain set
of religious or political or cultural beliefs, and educational programs that are not, and do not. Certainly in
the decades since Barnette was handed down, numerous judicial decisions have tried to draw distinguish
between impermissible and permissible kinds of educational compulsion. See, e.g., Brinsdon v. McAllen,
832 F.3d 519, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2016) (requiring student to recite Mexican pledge of allegiance in Spanish
class did not violate First Amendment because there was no evidence that the required speech involved
an attempt to compel the speaker’s affirmative belief); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987)
(striking down law that required schools that taught evolution to also teach creation science because the
government was able to “identif[y] no clear secular purpose for the [law]”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
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The democratic logic of the opinion explains more generally why Justice
Jackson was careful to limit the right against compelled speech to speech on
“politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion” and to insist that
the First Amendment protects a “right of self-determination in matters that
touch individual opinion and personal attitude,” but not a right of selfdetermination more generally. Laws that compel speech about matters other
than opinion may pose the same threat to speaker autonomy as laws that
compel the assertion of belief. But they do not pose the same threat to the
democratic principles that Jackson emphasized in his opinion. This is because
they do not purport to grant the government a power that, on the majority’s
view, no democratic government may possess: namely, the power to dictate
to their citizens what view they may hold on contested normative questions.
Of course, laws that require the disclosure of facts may end up shaping public
discourse in one way or another.63 They nevertheless leave it up to members
of the public to do what they will with the facts they receive. They do not, in
other words, require citizens to adopt the government’s value system or its
normative conclusions. They respect in this way the foundational autonomy
vested in citizens of a democratic state to make their own moral evaluations
of the world they find themselves in, and to act accordingly.64
This is not to say that laws that compel the disclosure of facts pose no
threat to the health and vitality of the democratic system. For one thing, the
line between fact and opinion is not always clear. Although we may, in
principle, distinguish facts from opinions by their falsifiability, in practice
there may be many claims about the world that—although potentially
falsifiable—are not able to be falsified given our present state of knowledge.
When the government compels the assertion of these kinds of facts, it
essentially requires speakers to assert a belief, albeit one that may one day be

38, 56 (1985) (striking down law requiring students to participate in a moment of silence in school because
it had no “clear[] secular purpose”).
63 A law that requires companies to publicly disclose whether their products were manufactured
in a war zone, for example, might have the effect of generating public debate about that war, or the moral
responsibility of corporations that do business in it. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. S.E.C., 748 F.3d 359, 371
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (construing an SEC rule that required companies to disclose whether they used products
that were manufactured in the war-stricken Congo as a law that essentially required companies to “confess
blood on [their] hands . . . .”).
64 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
334, 356 (1991) (arguing that a fundamental premise of the First Amendment is that the government may
not force people to “pursue . . . the government’s objectives—instead of their own.”); Frank I. Michelman,
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26 (1986) (arguing that an important
presupposition of the republican tradition is the idea that “we are free only insofar as we are self-governing
[meaning that we] direct[] our actions in accordance with . . . reasons we adopt for ourselves, as proper to
ourselves, upon conscious, critical reflection . . . .”).
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empirically tested. This is obviously problematic for all the reasons discussed
above.65
Even laws that require the disclosure of only facts that are subject to
empirical verification may represent an undemocratic exercise of power
when they are motivated by a desire to advantage or disadvantage a particular
group or ideology—when they are, to use Justice Jackson’s language,
“partisan, or [the] enemy of any class, creed, party or faction.”66 The same is
true of laws that, although motivated by entirely legitimate aims, make it, in
practice, very difficult for minority groups to express their views publicly.
This is the lesson from NAACP v. Alabama.67
Some level of judicial scrutiny may therefore be required to check that
the government, when it compels the expression of fact, is not seeking to
further a partisan end, or making it in practice very difficult for some speakers
to express themselves. It is difficult, however, to see why laws of this sort
should be treated as the “constitutional equivalent” of laws that compel the
disclosure of opinion, if what one cares about primarily is that the
government does not have the power to control democratic public opinion or
to otherwise coerce the consent of the governed.
One could of course argue that laws that compel the expression of fact
are democratically problematic because they deprive members of the political
community of a fundamental right of democratic citizenship: namely, the

65 This explains why, even in the commercial speech context, courts defer to disclosure
requirements only when they require the disclosure of “true and uncontroversial” facts—a phrase we might
interpret to refer to facts that are not only widely accepted but that are also able to be empirically tested.
66 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). Justice Jackson did not spell
out what he thought an education was not partisan or the enemy of any class, creed, party, or faction would
look like, but presumably what he meant by this was that education should neither advance a partisan
ideological agenda nor have the effect of stigmatizing or marginalizing any group. One might query
whether it is ever possible to achieve a truly non-partisan education, in this sense of the term. Debates
about the teaching of evolution and/or creationism in the classroom demonstrate how difficult it can be
for school authorities to provide an education that is not perceived by some parents and children as
stigmatizing or marginalizing their religious faith or point of view. As a practical, matter, however, it
certainly seems possible to draw a distinction between educational programs that are intended to, or have
the effect, of significantly stigmatizing, or privileging, a certain set of religious or political or cultural
beliefs, and educational programs that are not, and do not. Certainly in the decades since Barnette was
handed down, numerous judicial decisions have tried to draw distinguish between impermissible and
permissible kinds of educational compulsion. See, e.g., Brinsdon v. McAllen, 832 F.3d 519, 530–31 (5th
Cir. 2016) (requiring student to recite Mexican pledge of allegiance in Spanish class did not violate First
Amendment because there was no evidence that the required speech involved an attempt to compel the
speaker’s affirmative belief); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (striking down law that
required schools that taught evolution to also teach creation science because the government was able to
“identif[y] no clear secular purpose for the [law].”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (striking
down law requiring students to participate in a moment of silence in school because it had no “clear[]
secular purpose.”).
67

See 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also supra note 23.
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right to determine for themselves what facts are true. In recent years, some
scholars have suggested something along these lines. James Weinstein has
argued, for example, that it is “a fundamental . . . precept of American
popular sovereignty that the people, not the government, are entrusted with
determining the veracity of statements in public discourse.”68 This is not how
the Court has traditionally viewed the matter, however. Instead, it has taken
for granted that, while the government may not patrol false opinions, it may
patrol false facts—at least when they are libelous or otherwise socially
harmful—without violating any principles of democratic sovereignty, let
alone fundamental ones.69 One can understand why. Lies not only deceive
but disempower their hearers, by depriving them of the ability to accurately
assess the world around them, and on that basis to reach conclusions about
how they and others should act.70 They make it harder, in other words, for
citizens to effectively exercise their political power. The result is that both
laws that punish false statements of fact and laws that compel the disclosure
of facts can promote, rather than threaten democratic values, even if it is also
the case that they can be misused.
Perhaps no case better illustrates how unthreatening to democratic
principles laws that compel the disclosure of true fact may be than the law
struck down by the Court in Riley. By requiring professional fundraisers to
disclose how much of the money they received in donations they gave to
charities, the law obviously compelled fundraisers to speak when they
otherwise might not. There was no evidence, however, that the North
Carolina legislature that enacted the law did so in order to promote a
particular government-favored point of view, or to punish the fundraisers for

68 James Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizen Competence and the First
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 343 (2018); see also ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 29 (2016) (“[G]overnment control over truth is in tension with democratic
legitimation. Citizens who seek to participate in public discourse and who are penalized because they
disagree with official versions of factual truth, are excluded from the possibility of influencing public
opinion.”).
69 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 721
(2012) (plurality) (“As our law and tradition show, then, there are instances in which the falsity of speech
bears upon whether it is protected. Some false speech may be prohibited even if analogous true speech
could not be.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”).
70 Strauss, supra note 64, at 355 (“Lying forces the victim to pursue the speaker’s objectives
instead of the victim’s own objectives. If the capacity to decide upon a plan of life and to determine one’s
own objectives is integral to human nature, lies that are designed to manipulate people are a uniquely
severe offense against human autonomy.”).
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the views they held.71 Nor is there any reason to believe that the law had a
viewpoint discriminatory effect, or otherwise distorted or limited public
debate about charitable giving, or the particular issues the charities regulated
by the law addressed. One can disagree with North Carolina’s decision to
impose a disclosure requirement on professional fundraisers on policy
grounds. The Red Cross and other national charities submitted an amicus
brief to the Court in which they argued that the law was bad economic policy
because it would deter charitable giving by focusing consumer attention on
the costs of fundraising, rather than the good the charities regulated by the
law achieved.72 But it is hard to see how the law posed any threat whatsoever
to the democratic principles invoked in Justice Jackson’s opinion. One might
in fact conclude, to the contrary, that the North Carolina law, like many other
disclosure laws, encouraged democratic critique by giving consumers more
information than they would otherwise possess about the virtues and the vices
of the existing regulatory system. At the very least, it can be understood as
an attempt by the North Carolina legislature to avoid a “collision” between
the right of fundraisers to determine the content of their charitable
solicitations and the right of consumers to know how their charitable dollars
would be spent by imposing on fundraisers a very modest disclosure
requirement.
The decision in Riley demonstrates quite powerfully how the Court’s
reconceptualization of the right not to speak as a mechanism for protecting
the autonomy of individual speakers, rather than as a mechanism for ensuring
democratic freedom, has resulted in the creation of a much more expansive
right than Barnette suggested. It also demonstrates, consequently, how useful
a tool the right not to speak has become for those who wish to challenge
government policies that promote health and safety, consumer welfare, or
labor rights, by means of the mechanism of disclosure. Indeed, compelled
speech doctrine today represents an important front in the First Amendment
challenge to the regulatory state.73

71 Certainly, the fundraisers and charities that challenged the law provided no evidence of this kind
of bad governmental motive in their brief. See Brief for the Appellees at 7–9, (No. 87-328), Riley v. Nat’l
Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), 1988 WL 1031782, at *8–14.
72 Brief of Amici Curiae Independent Sector, American Cancer Society, American Red Cross,
Care, Inc., Certain Other Independent Sector Members and Other Nonprofit Organizations, (No. 87-318),
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), 1988 WL 1031783, at *20–21 (“[Because]
attracting and then retaining people’s interest always is difficult . . . [requiring disclosure of i]ssues outside
the charity’s chosen message, no matter how relevant to some citizens’ contribution decisions, will
dilute most people’s attention or turn them away from the charity and its message.”).
73 Lucien J. Dhooge, The First Amendment and Disclosure Regulations: Compelled Speech or
Corporate Opportunism?, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 599, 600 (2014) (noting that in recent years there have been
“numerous judicial challenges to federal disclosure regulations by individual companies and trade
associations utilizing the First Amendment and, specifically, the prohibition upon compelled speech.”).
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It is virtually impossible to believe that any of the justices who joined
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Barnette would have signed on to this
reimagining of its meaning. All were progressives and/or New Dealers—that
is to say, jurists who believed in the value of the regulatory state and its ability
to promote human liberty, not just threaten it. They were also justices who
were keenly aware of the threat that an overly absolutist First Amendment
posed to the health and flourishing of the regulatory state.
Justice Black made this concern unmistakably clear in the concurring
opinion he wrote to explain why he and Justice Douglas had chosen to join
Justice Jackson’s majority opinion only three years after voting to uphold a
very similar flag salute law in Gobitis. It was, Justice Black wrote, their
“reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid bar against state
regulation of conduct thought inimical to the public welfare” that had led
both he and Justice Douglas to vote with the majority in the earlier case.74
Although over time they had come to believe that this reluctance was
insufficient to justify a flag salute like the one in West Virginia, which did
little to promote the public good, Justice Black insisted that the principle
remained a sound one.75 “No well-ordered society can leave to the individuals
an absolute right to make final decisions, unassailable by the State, as to
everything they will or will not do,” Justice Black argued. “The First
Amendment does not go so far.”76
In his majority opinion, Justice Jackson also acknowledged, albeit less
explicitly, the threat that an overly individualistic interpretation of the First
Amendment posed to the health of the regulatory state. He noted, for
example, that “the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of
Rights, conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the
eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the
problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence.”77 This
was not so much, Justice Jackson explained, because of the technological and
economic changes that had taken place between the eighteenth and twentieth
centuries. Instead it reflected the profound transformation that had taken
place over that period in the dominant understanding of the nature and
purpose of government. The principles the Bill of Rights announced, Justice

74

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (Black, J., concurring).

Id. at 644 (“Words uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty to nothing but self-interest. Love
of country must spring from willing hearts and free minds, inspired by a fair administration of wise laws
enacted by the people’s elected representatives within the bounds of express constitutional prohibitions. .
. . The ceremonial, when enforced against conscientious objectors, [is] more likely to defeat than to serve
its high purpose, [and] is a handy implement for disguised religious persecution.”).
75

76

Id. at 643.

77

Id. at 639.
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Jackson wrote, “grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the
individual was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through
mere absence of governmental restraints, and that government should be
entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s
affairs.”78 In the contemporary period, in contrast, “the laissez-faire concept
or principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs,
and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration
of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.”79
It was against the backdrop of this changed reality, Justice Jackson insisted,
that the Court would and should interpret the meaning of freedom of speech.80
The sensitivity to historical context that both Justices Jackson and
Black’s opinions in Barnette reveal—as well as their keen desire to avoid
making the First Amendment an overly rigid constraint on the power of the
welfare state—suggests that not only did they not strike down the flag salute
law because it infringed a generalized right to speaker autonomy, but that
they would have been unwilling to read a right of this sort into the First
Amendment. To do so, after all, would have been to construe the First
Amendment as a guarantee of the kind of negative or “laissez faire” liberty
that Justice Jackson associated with the eighteenth-century constitutional
order that the New Deal Court had only just a few years earlier rejected.
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Barnette suggests instead a more positive view
of the liberty that the First Amendment guarantees. It construes the First
Amendment to guarantee to the individual the right to live in a democratic
state and to participate in the democratic processes of self-government, not
the right to say whatever one wishes, free of government control. This is a
vision of the First Amendment, however, that is quickly receding into the
past.
*
The preceding discussion suggests that, rather than the ordinary
processes of common law adjudication whereby principles are reshaped and
sometimes expanded upon acquaintance with new sets of facts, the changes
that have taken place in First Amendment compelled speech doctrine over
the past seventy years instead reflect a wholesale transformation in the
Court’s understanding of the purposes that the prohibition against compelled
speech serves. These days, the Court no longer views the prohibition against
compelled speech as a means of preventing the government from coercing
the consent of the governed. Instead, it views it as a mechanism for ensuring
78

Id. 639–40.

79

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).

Id. (“These changed conditions often deprive precedents of reliability and cast us more than we
would choose upon our own judgment. But we act in these matters not by authority of our competence but
by force of our commissions.”).
80
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that choices about what to say and what not to say are, except in extraordinary
circumstances, the individual’s and not the government’s to make. The result
is a much more expansive prohibition against compelled speech than the
Justices who joined the majority opinion in Barnette could have envisaged.
The extent of this transformation should not be overstated.
Notwithstanding the Court’s assertion in Riley and Hurley, and more recently
Becerra, that laws that compel the disclosure of facts are constitutionally
equivalent to laws that compel the assertion of opinion, lower courts continue
in some cases to subject the former to more deferential scrutiny than the
latter. Many of these involve laws or policies that require the nonpublic
disclosure of information to the government.81 But even in cases involving
the kind of public, noncommercial speech that has long been of primary First
Amendment concern, lower courts find creative ways to distinguish the
Court’s contrary precedents away, or else simply ignore them.82
The Court itself recently suggested that there are limits to how broadly
the rule against the compelled disclosure of facts applies. In his opinion in
Becerra, for example, Justice Thomas asserted that the holding in the case
did not call into question the “legality of health and safety warnings long
considered permissible.” 83 Nor, Justice Thomas asserted, did the Court’s
holding call into question its earlier decision in Planned Parenthood of
Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, which rejected a compelled speech
challenge to a Pennsylvania law that required doctors who perform abortions
to inform their patients about “the nature of the procedure, the health risks of
the abortion and childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the unborn
child” before they could proceed.84 Casey held that when the government
compels doctors to provide information to their patients as part of the

81 See, e.g., United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting compelled speech
challenge to law that required taxpayer to disclose information about his clients to the Internal Revenue
Service because the law did not require the taxpayer “to disseminate publicly a message with which he
disagrees.”); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., 58 Cal. 4th 329, 345–52 (2013) (applying rational
basis scrutiny to state law that required prescription drug claims processors to compile and summarize
information on pharmacy fees and to transmit the information to their clients).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2014). For example, in United States
v. Arnold, the Fifth Circuit held that a provision in the Sex Offenders Registration Act that required sex
offenders to publicly disclose their status in a public database did not violate the First Amendment right
not to speak because it required the disclosure of only facts, not opinion. 740 F.3d at 1035. In concluding
as much, the Fifth Circuit entirely ignored the contrary precedents of Riley and Hurley.
83

Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018).

84

Id. at 2373–74 (plurality opinion) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884

(1992)).
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“practice of medicine” it need only satisfy rational basis scrutiny.85 This
holding, Justice Thomas made clear, remained good law, notwithstanding the
Becerra Court’s otherwise unequivocal rejection of the idea that ordinary
First Amendment rules do not apply to “professional speech.”86
Justice Thomas provided little by way of a principled explanation,
however, for why the FACT Act was not a regulation of medicine.87 Nor did
he explain why laws that compel doctors to speak as part of the practice of
medicine should be exempt from the general presumption against compelled
expression. Do doctors not have autonomy rights?88 Justice Thomas also did
not provide any explanation for why the principles enunciated in the case did
not call into question the constitutionality of “health and safety warnings long
considered permissible.”89
It remains somewhat mysterious as a result exactly how significantly the
Court’s reconceptualization of the right not to speak will limit the
government’s ability to mandate the disclosure of facts. Nevertheless,
Becerra, and the many lower court decisions which have treated laws that
require the disclosure of facts as presumptively unconstitutional, suggest that
the impact of the Court’s reconceptualization of the right not to speak as an
autonomy right will not be insignificant.90 They suggest that the rule against
compelled speech not only can but will be used to strike down laws that pose

85 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion) (“To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights
not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing
and regulation by the State.”).
86

Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–73.

Id. at 2385–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority tries to distinguish Casey. . . . This
distinction, however, lacks moral, practical, and legal force. The individuals at issue here are all medical
personnel engaging in activities that directly affect a woman’s health—not significantly different from the
doctors at issue in Casey. . . . The Act requires these medical professionals to disclose information about
the possibility of abortion (including potential financial help) that is as likely helpful to granting ‘informed
consent’ as is information about the possibility of adoption and childbirth. . . . If the law in Casey regulated
speech ‘only as part of the practice of medicine,’ so too here.”).
87

88 Thomas argued that laws like the one upheld in Casey were subject to more deferential scrutiny
because they constituted merely incidental regulations of speech, not direct regulations like the FACT
Act. Id. at 2373. This is not the case however. The Court has made clear in previous decisions that laws
are not incidental regulations of speech if their application “depends on what [speakers] say.” Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 27 (2010). See also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1741 (2018) (asserting the same). As a result, the Pennsylvania law
upheld in Casey is no more an incidental regulation of speech than the law struck down in Becerra. The
only important distinction between the two laws is that the Pennsylvania law discourages women from
obtaining abortions, whereas the FACT Act (to some degree at least) encourages it. But if this is the true
basis of the distinction Justice Thomas drew in Becerra, it is a deeply disturbing one because what it
produces is just the kind of viewpoint discrimination that the First Amendment is supposed to prevent.
89 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (making this point).
90

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. N.L.R.B., 717 F.3d 947, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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little threat to the vitality of the democratic public sphere, or to the ability of
heterodox speakers to publicly express their views.
This is troubling, not only because it makes it much more likely that the
First Amendment will serve as the kind of “rigid bar” to government
regulation that Justice Black worried it could, but should not, become. The
expansive view of the First Amendment right not to speak that Riley and
Becerra articulate will also make it harder for the government to protect the
autonomy of listeners—listeners like the patients at the crisis pregnancy
centers in Becerra and the donors in Riley—by ensuring that they have
adequate information to make an informed choice about where to get medical
care, to give their money, or make other choices of the kind. This is because,
by focusing entirely on the autonomy interests of the speaker, they give short
shrift to the autonomy interests of the listeners. It is not at all obvious why
the one should matter more than the other for First Amendment purposes. A
significant advantage of the democracy-focused conception of the rule
against compelled speech advanced in Barnette is that, by protecting the
autonomy of the democratic citizen, it protects the autonomy of speakers and
listeners both.
Despite these obvious problems, the decision last term in Becerra
suggests that the Court remains strongly committed to the expansive,
autonomy-focused conception of the First Amendment right not to speak it
first suggested in Tornillo and spelled out in Riley. This means that, even as
we celebrate Barnette’s continuing relevance to free speech law, it is
important to also take stock the profound change that has taken place in the
law of compelled speech since Barnette was handed down. Barnette may still
be a star in the sky of First Amendment jurisprudence, but it is a fixed star no
longer. The First Amendment it illuminates looks a lot more like the laissez
faire constitutional order that the New Deal Court that decided Barnette
believed it had left behind. More specifically, the freedom that the Court
today protects in the name of the First Amendment is very different than the
freedom that Barnette celebrated. This is vital to recognize, if we want to
understand not only the First Amendment’s past, but its present and future
also.

